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Abstract
Preserving privacy while publishing data has emerged as key research area in
data security and has become a primary issue in publishing person specific sensi-
tive information. How to preserve one’s privacy efficiently is a critical issue while
publishing data. k - Anonymity is a key technique for de-identifying the sensitive
datasets. In our work, we have described an approach to implement various k -
anonymity algorithms and also propose a parallelism method that produces better
results with the real-world datasets. Additionally, we suggest a new approach that
attains better results by applying a parallelism approach and exploiting various
characteristics of our suggested approach. The proposed approach uses the con-
cept of samarati algorithm to generalize the lattice and uses the binary search
method. The proposed algorithm generates the levels using binary search in the
lattice and then uses the parallel mechanism for evaluating the nodes. The pro-
posed algorithm has less execution time than other full domain generalization
algorithms for k -anonymization.
Key words: k -Anonymity, Parallelism, Full Domain Generalization, Quasi-Identifier.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over last 20 years, the digitization of our daily lives has led to an increase in
the data collected by individuals, corporations, and governments. This digitally
available data (known as microdata) has created a good opportunity for decision
making based on available information. Because of mutual benefits, or by orga-
nization’s policies, publication of digitally available data is required to improve
decision making. But the collected microdata in its native form may contain per-
son specific sensitive information of individuals whose privacy can be violated if
the original data is published.
So the important task is to protect the privacy of this microdata. There
exists some guidelines, agreements and policies about how and what data should
be published so that the data remains useful for research and analysis and at
the same, individual’s privacy is preserved, referred as privacy preserving data
publishing (PPDP) [1].
Privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP) is an approach to publish prac-
tically useful data without violating individuals privacy. PPDP focuses on data
anonymization that attempt to conceal the identity of record holders, considering
that private data must be maintained for data analysis [2]. PPDP consist of two
phases: Data collection and data publication.
1. Data collection: in this phase, the original data from record holders is re-
trieved by the data publisher.
2. Data publishing: in this phase, the data retrieved by record holders in data
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collection phase, is released to data recipient for analysis and mining purpose.
A real time scenario of PPDP is given as follows:
Figure 1.1: Privacy Preserving Data Publishing
In this example, we can compare this with the hospital patient scenario where
Alice, Bob, Cathy, Doug are the patient (Record holders) and data publisher
(hospital) collects the information from record owners and gives it medical center
(Data recipient) for research and analysis purpose [3]. Finally data recipient per-
form data mining to retrieve useful information. On the basis of trust level the
data publisher is categorizes in two models: trusted data publisher and untrusted
data publisher.
1. Trusted Data publisher: In this model, the record holders know that the
data publisher is reliable and they are providing their personal information
for the analysis [4].
2. Untrusted data publisher: In it, the publisher may not be reliable and may
try to gain confidential information from the record holders.
2
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In this thesis, we consider only preserving of information privacy, which pro-
tects sensitive information from being brought to the attention of others. Privacy
preserving is the ability to limit the diffusion and use of one’s personal data. Pri-
vacy can refer to an individual where nobody should know about any entity after
performing data mining or an organization to protect knowledge about a collec-
tion of entities. Various approaches followed for individual privacy preserving are
data obfuscation, value swapping, perturbation, etc. Each organization adopts a
framework for disclosing individual entity values to the public.
1.1 Motivation
Nowadays, clinical institutions are increasingly asked to make their raw, non-
aggregated data (also called microdata), electronically available for research pur-
poses. However, since such data may contain private personal information as
in the case of medical records, the identity of the entities involved must remain
confidential.
A telephone poll has been conducted in the U.S. in which 88% of the respon-
dents replied that to the best of their knowledge, no medical data about themselves
had ever been given without their permission. In a second question, 87% said laws
should prohibit organizations from providing out medical data without obtaining
the patients permission. Thus, the public would prefer that only employees and
directly involved persons have authority to their records and that these people
be bound by the strict ethical and legal standards that prohibit’s further disclo-
sure [5].
Nowadays, the disclosure of health data is strictly regulated in many juris-
dictions, and institutions are often legally required to apply privacy-enhancing
transformations to health data prior to their disclosure to researchers. For exam-
ple, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [6] in the
U.S., and the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) [7] in Canada,
are the some of well-recognized privacy regulations, protects the confidentiality of
electronic healthcare data.
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In order to provide the privacy of the respondents to which the data refer,
released data were at first de-identified by removing all the explicit identifiers
such as phone numbers, addresses and names. However this de-identified data
could still have other implicit identifying characteristics such as sex, birth date,
race and postal code which, when considered all together, can uniquely, or almost
uniquely pertain to the specific individuals. These sets of characteristics are often
called quasi-identifiers.
For instance, in one study, Sweeney estimated that 87.1% of the United States
population can be uniquely recognized by the combination of the date of birth,
gender, 5-digit ZIP code because such information can be linked to public od free
available databases such as driving records and voter list. To prove her point,
Sweeney re-identified a series of supposedly anonymous medical data including
one data, which belonging to William Weld the governor of Massachusetts at the
time using a voter list she bought from the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts for
a mere $20 [8] [5].
To illustrate the concept, consider 1.1, which exemplifies medical data to be re-
leased. In this table, data have been de-identified by suppressing names and Social
Security Numbers (SSNs) so not to explicitly disclose the identities of patients.
Table 1.1: Deidentified private table (medical data)
SSN. Name Race DOB SEX ZIP Marital Status Disease
asian 64/04/12 F 94142 divorced hypertension
asian 64/09/13 F 94141 divorced obesity
asian 64/04/15 M 94140 married chest pain
asian 63/06/13 F 94139 married obesity
asian 63/06/18 M 94139 married short breath
black 65/08/27 F 94138 single short breath
black 64/08/27 F 94139 single obesity
white 65/08/27 M 94139 single chest pain
white 64/08/27 M 94141 widow short breath
However, notice that there is only one divorced female (F) born on 64/04/12
and living in the 94142 area. This combination, if unique in publicly available
databases such as in Table- 1.2, identifies the corresponding tuple as pertaining to
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Table 1.2: Non-de-identified publicly available table
Name. Address City ZIP DOB Sex Marital Status
– – – – – – –
– – – – – – –
Alex 120 PK Street Texas 94142 64/04/12 F divorced
– – – – – – –
– – – – – – –
Alex, 120 PK Street, Texas, thus revealing that she has reported hypertension [9].
In order to overcome the potential for a privacy breach, some researchers tried
to further de-identify the data by using techniques such as scrambling and swap-
ping values and adding noise to the data while maintaining an overall statistical
property of the result. However, this compromised the integrity, or truthfulness,
of the information released [1].
In a different direction, intensive research has been directed towards the anonymiza-
tion of the data. Although guaranteeing complete anonymity is obviously an im-
possible task, the k -anonymity concept has been introduced: ”A data release is
said to satisfy k -anonymity if every combination of values of quasi-identifiers can
be distinctly matched to at least k individuals in that release”.
1.2 Objective
Several algorithms were developed with the purpose of making de-identified data
k -anonymous [10], hence readily available for researchers. However, we are only
concerned with the methods that aim to achieve k -anonymity through full domain
global recoding, hierarchical generalization and minimal suppression, as will be
motivated in the next chapter. Mainly, two of the most popular approaches that
fall under the former specifications and that were heavily used so far for clinical
data are Sweenys Datafly algorithm and Samaratis algorithm.
So far no one has empirically evaluated these algorithms in order to recognize
which does a better job in balancing satisfactory privacy with minimum informa-
5
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tion loss, or how their solution compares with respect to the optimal one. More
importantly, these approaches always rely on some heuristic that would approxi-
mate a ”good” solution rather than actually finding the optimal one with respect
to any given preference or information loss metrics.
Other existing methods, such as Incognito, tend to find all the possible so-
lutions. However, a major drawback of such approaches is that the number of
solutions they return is usually very high, and it is impractical to check the infor-
mation loss of all of them in order to find the optimal one.
Resolving the above issues is very important. Accordingly, by assuring better
solutions, researchers will benefit immensely, since the better the quality of the
anonymized data, and the less the information loss, the more valuable that data
is for their research. Therefore, our objective is to evaluate these algorithms and
determine whether a better one can be devised in order to efficiently find an op-
timal solution.
1.3 Thesis Contribution
The contribution of this thesis is two field: criteria:
1. First, we implemented the following algorithms
• Samarati Algorithm
• OLA Algorithm and
• Incognito Algorithm
2. Second, we propose our own approach, a new method to find efficiently an
optimal solution.
6
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1.4 Thesis Organization
• Chapter-1, In this chapter we explore briefly about data publishing and
what is privacy preserving, why there is need of privacy preserving techniques
while publishing data. How anonymization can be used to preserve privacy
.To maintain privacy a model k -anonymity is explained in it and its basic
details and attack on this model.
• Chapter-2 In this chapter we have discussed, metric that are used to calcu-
late the quality of anonymized data, the previous algorithms that have been
used for k -anonymization.
• Chapter-3, In this chapter we explained that to achieve k -anonymity, the
best way is to find the lattice in the parallelism manner using minimum
information loss to obtain the local optimal node.
• Chapter-4, In the chapter we have plotted the graph, for different values of
k taken execution time vs quasi-identifier and distortion vs quasi-identifier.
We compare and analysis the results of our approach with previous algo-
rithms.
• Chapter-5, In this chapter, we have explained that after comparing the
results and analysis we can conclude that our purposed algorithm gives takes
less time than other efficient algorithms while other metric also gives better
results in maximum cases.
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Literature Survey
2.1 Preliminary Concepts and Definitions
In what follows, we assume the existence of an already de-identified private1 table
PT to be anonymized. The rows in PT may be referred to as tuples, and the
table is assumed to have at least k tuples. Moreover, the columns in the table are
the attributes, and unless otherwise mentioned, the set of PT’s attributes will be
strictly considered as the quasi-identifier.
In basic scenario of privacy preserving data publishing, the published data
table has the following form:
DT (Explicit Identifier, Quasi-Identifier, Sensitive Attributes, Non-Sensitive
Attributes)
Table 2.1: Identifier’s
Identifier Quasi-Identifier Sensitive
Name Birth Date Sex Zipcode Disease
Alice 21/01/79 Male 52368 Flu
Beth 15/11/81 Female 56478 Hepatitis
Carol 23/05/79 Female 52314 AIDS
Dan 06/12/84 Male 50301 Canser
Ellen 20/09/83 Female 57612 Fever
2.1.1 Explicit Identifier
It is a group of attributes (for e.g. voter id, Name etc.), able to identify individual
record explicitly.
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2.1.2 Quasi-Identifier
A group of attributes from a table whose combination can be used to identify
some other record from dataset. Quasi-identifiers may be used to re-identify an
individual record from the table. For example [2] combination of (Job, Postcode,
and Date of birth) of all these attribute may use to determine any individual
record from the table, to his/her medical problem.
One of the methods applied in order to satisfy k -anonymity is the generalisation
of data so that the tuples in PT can be distinctly matched to at least k other tuples.
Because of the nature of clinical data, we are mainly concerned with hierarchical
generalization.
2.1.3 Sensitive-attributes
Sensitive Attributes contain the sensitive person-specific information which an
individual will never want to disclose it. Non-Sensitive attributes are those who
do not come under remaining three types of attributes.
2.1.4 k-anonymity
In the generalized table, a tuple must be indistinguishable from (k -1) other tu-
ples having the same quasi-identifier. A relation is consist of quasi-identifier
and non-quasi-identifier attributes in which quasi-identifier attributes needs to
be anonymized.
k - Anonymity states that there should be at least k tuples having the same
quasi-identifier values to guarantee an individual’s privacy [11]. Every tuple in a
table should be similar to at least (k -1) tuples then only the table will achieve
k -anonymity. k -anonymity is achieved by using generalization and suppression.
Following is an example of a table satisfying 2 -anonymity with respect to each
attribute [4].
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Table 2.2: Example of a data table
Age. Gender Zipcode
34 Male 81667
15 Female 81675
66 Male 81925
70 Female 81931
34 Female 81931
70 Male 81931
45 Male 81931
Table 2.3: Example 2-anonymous data table
Age. Gender Zipcode
< 50 * 816**
< 50 * 816**
≥ 50 * 819**
≥ 50 * 819**
< 50 * 819**
≥ 50 * 819**
< 50 * 819**
2.2 Anonymization
Protection of individual’s confidential data is of prime importance. Releasing
individual’s data (containing sensitive information) publicly might cause risk for
individual’s privacy [12]. So the first step to anonymize the table is to remove the
explicit identifier because this attribute directly reveals identity of record holder.
But L Sweeney’s survey [13] shows that removing explicit identifier is not
enough to protect individual’s privacy. The survey shows that approximately 87
percentage of USA citizens can be re-identified with the help of birth data, zip code
and gender attributes when linked with the voter list database to the published
medical database. According to this survey, the record holder is linked with the
publicly available databases and re-identified with the help of quasi-identifiers
(date of birth, gender and age), for this linking attack [9], adversary requires
only these two prior knowledge: the record of the victim should be present in the
published database and the quasi-identifier of the victim.
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Figure 2.1: Linking attack to identify record holder
2.3 Attack Models in Privacy Preserving and
Data Publishing
According to Dalenius [1977] [10], the privacy protection is not allowing an ad-
versary to gain any person-specific sensitive information of a targeted individual
even though he has some background knowledge from external sources. The at-
tack models in the PPDP can be categorized in two ways based on their attack
principles: [14] In the first type, if an adversary finds a way to map a record holder
to a tuple present in the published anonymized table or to an sensitive attribute
in the table, these are known as linking attacks. In second type, main focus of
the adversary is to gain information about the victim with the help of previously
known knowledge (background knowledge).
2.3.1 Record Linkage
Record linkage refers to the mapping of some records to the targeted victim in
the publicly released table based on quasi-identifier of the victim. If the victim’s
quasi-identifier matches with the records in the released table then the adversary
faces less no. of possibilities for targeted record with some additional information.
From given tables 2.4 to 2.7, the research centre maps the records in table
2.4 and 2.5 based on same quasi-identifiers present in both table it gain sensitive
11
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information, here by joining these two tables 2.4 and 2.5 for quasi-identifier job,
sex and age it can found that male whose age is 38 and profession is lawyer suffers
from HIV is mapped to Doug.
To avoid such type of attack by record linkage, a new technique is proposed
by Sweeney, Samarati [14] in this model for each set of all quasi-identifiers having
same value in table must have at least k number of records .The benefit of this
model is that there are other (k -1) tuples that are mapped to same quasi-identifier
set with probability of attack 1/k. As it shown in table 1.1 for quasi-identifier (job,
birth, post code).
Subset Property of k-anonymity: If a table is k -anonymous with a set of quasi-
identifiers Q, then the must satisfy k -anonymity with respect to all subset Q [15].
Table 2.4: Patient Table
Job. Sex Age Disease
Engineer Male 35 Hepatitis
Engineer Male 35 Hepatitis
Lawyer Male 38 HIV
Writer Female 30 FLU
Writer Female 30 HIV
Dancer Female 30 HIV
Dancer Female 30 HIV
Table 2.5: 3-Anonymous Table
Job. Sex Age Disease
Professional Male 35-40 Hepatitis
Professional Male 35-40 Hepatitis
Professional Male 35-40 HIV
Artist Female 30-35 HIV
Artist Female 30-35 HIV
Artist Female 30-35 HIV
Artist Female 30-35 HIV
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Table 2.6: External Table
Name. Job Sex Age
Alice Writer Female 30
Bob Engineer Male 35
Cathy Writer Female 30
Doug Lawyer Male 38
Emily Dancer Female 30
Fred Engineer Male 38
Gradys Dancer Female 30
Henry Lawyer Male 30
Irene Dancer Female 32
Table 2.7: 4-Anonymous External Table
Name. Job Sex Age
Alice Artist Female [30-35)
Bob Professional Male [35-40)
Cathy Artist Female [30-35)
Doug Professional Male [35-40)
Emily Artist Female [30-35)
Fred Professional Male [35-40)
Gradys Artist Female [30-35)
Henry Professional Male [30-35)
Irene Artist Female [30-35)
2.3.2 Attribute Linkage
In this attack, attacker gain some information about his sensitive attribute from
the released table, even though attacker is not able to link the victim with any
individual published record [4]. From the table 2.7, attacker can find that all the
female having age 30 whose profession is dance suffer from HIV. So Dance, Female,
30 is confidence 100 percent HIV by this information it found that Emily suffers
from HIV. l -Diversity. To prevent from attribute linkage attack it is purposed
by Machanavjjhala [16] .Its necessary conditions is every equivalence of released
table must have at least l different values. The fundamental concept is to avoid
attribute linkage as we seen from the last example if there will be different unique
sensitive values it prevents attribute linkage. But probabilistic attacks cannot be
13
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avoided by this because u is very common disease compared to HIV. The released
table satisfy l -diverse property if for all qid group:
⇒
∑
(P (qid, s)log(P (qid, s)) ≥ log(l) (2.1)
Here S is sensitive attribute, P(qid, s) is a part of records whose sensitive value
is s for the total records whose equivalence class is group denoted by qid [11]. The
more uniformly distributed sensitive values in each equivalence class group qid
higher will be the entropy of sensitive attribute. So higher value of entropy in the
released table, lesser is the chances probabilistic attack, higher value of threshold
l increases its privacy and lesser is the information gain by attacker from released
table.
Limitations: The major drawback of entropy l -diversity is it is not able to the
measure of probabilistic attack [17] for eg as it is calculated entropy is 1.8 but in
second equivalence group out of 4 records 3 suffers from HIV from table 2.7, which
is easy for probabilistic attack.
2.4 Anonymizing Operations
The table which contains the original records values of each individual person
do not provide any privacy. To publish it and to preserve the privacy of each
individual person, some operations have to be performed.
Anonymization is a technique to solve the problem of data publishing, it while
keep the sensitive information of record owner which is to be used for data analysis
it hides the explicit identity of that record owner from the table which is going to
be published.
Anonymization can be done by using following operations [18]
1. Generalization
2. Suppression
14
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2.4.1 Generalization
Generalization modifies the quasi-identifier original most specific value to the some
generalized values of specific description [13], e.g. specific form date of birth to
generalize to year only while hiding month and date value. Full-domain gener-
alization scheme while generalizing, for all records and for any quasi-identifier,
generalization is applied up to few level of hierarchy tree for e.g. If an equivalence
class of writer, dancer is generalized to Artist then other equivalence of Engineer,
Lawyer must be generalized to Professional. Generalized table is consistent and it
is used in global recoding algorithms, but the major drawback of this is data loss
is very high..
1. Subtree Generalization
In subtree generalization scheme [6], at any node other than leaf node, either
all its child values are generalized or none is generalized. For example if all
dancer is generalized to artist then writer have to be generalized to artist
but doctor and engineer may be generalized can retain its specific value at
leaf level. It is used in Global recoding algorithms.
2. Sibling Generalization
In this generalization scheme [7], that is same as subtree generalization but in
this some sibling can remain un-generalized. For e.g. If dancer is generalized
to artist then writer may remain un-generalized. It gives the lesser distortion
compared to subtree and full domain and used in global recoding algorithms.
3. Cell Generalization
All the generalization schemes [8], that are discussed earlier used, are called
global recoding. They give more distortion in this scheme is a value is
generalized in one record then for that specific value must be generalized in
all other records also. But In cell generalization, it is known as local recoding
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there is not restriction means if a value is generalized in one record the same
value for same attribute in other record may be un-generalized. For example
in a record dancer is generalized to artist dancer in other records may remain
un-generalized.
Figure 2.2: GH for marital status
Figure 2.3: GH for Race
2.4.2 Suppression
Suppression is similar to generalization but in this values of quasi-identifier is com-
pletely hidden [19] for e.g. from sex male female to any or not released or from
specific profession to value is suppressed to not released at all. Different suppres-
sion types are defined as
16
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Figure 2.4: GH for Age
1. Record Level: When the complete entry of a record from the table is elimi-
nated or suppressed.
2. Value Level: When all instance or records of a particular value in the table
is suppressed
3. Cell Level: When some of records for a given value are suppressed in a table.
2.4.3 Domain Generalization Hierarchy:
Domain Generalization Hierarchy can be defined as a graph or a lattice which acts
as the solution space for our k -anonymity problem. The nodes of this lattice are
achieved by generalizing different combination of attributes together at various
levels. [20]
Example: Consider two attributes ”Sex” and ”PIN Code” of a relation T.
Value of attribute Sex at level 0 of generalization can be ”Male” and ”Female”.
To achieve level-1 of generalization with respect to attribute Sex we must general-
ize the values ”Male” and ”Female”. We can generalize these two values to another
value, say, ”Person”. By generalizing the values of attribute Sex to ”Person” we
achieve level-2 generalization with respect to Sex. Lets take another attribute PIN
17
2.4 Anonymizing Operations Literature Survey
Code from relation T. Let us assume that PIN Code can have values ”110010”,
”110011” and ”110012” at level-0 generalization. We can generalize these values
to ”11000x” and ”11001x” to achieve level 1 generalization with respect to at-
tribute PIN Code. Further, we can generalize the values to ”1100xx” in order to
achieve level-2 generalization with respect to attribute PIN Code. By combining
different levels of generalization of different attributes we can form the Domain
Generalization Hierarchy as shown in the fig 2.5.
Full Domain Generalization Hierarchy: can be defined as a graph or
a lattice which acts as the solution space for our k-anonymity problem. The
nodes of this lattice are achieved by generalizing different combination of attributes
together at various levels.
Figure 2.5: Example of a Lattice generalization
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2.5 Metrics used to Measure the Quality of Gen-
eralized Data
Privacy preserving data publishing have two objectives, privacy of individual entity
for each record must be preserved and published data must be information which
is useful for data mining. So the quality of anonymized data can be measured by
data metric which are classified into three categories.
2.5.1 General Purpose Metrics:
When data publisher do not know what data recipient want to know or analy-
sis from the published data so data publisher cant focus on any particular data
utility [15]. In this case data published is open to all like internet so that data
recipient based on their different interest and they do data mining according to
their requirement, in this is very obvious that same metric is not good or accurate
for different recipients. In this case for better utility of anonymized data, data
publisher choose metric which are more suitable for mostly all data recipients such
as ILoss, distortion, discernibility.
2.5.2 Special Purpose Metrics
If data publisher know for which purpose the published data will be data mined
or in which information or pattern data recipient is interested, so that they can
preserve their related information and publish the data according to their require-
ments. For example if the purpose of data recipient is to model the classification
based on a particular attribute in this case generalization must not be done for
values whose identification is necessary to assign a class, which is used for their
classification [21].
Classification Metric (CM) Iyengar proposed a metric to measure the clas-
sification error means a record is assigned to a class by assuming that in it a
particular class is not majority but in reality that class is not the majority class
so, record is assigned to wrong class [11]. There must be some penalty for it
or there is a penalty if record is suppressed completely and not assigned to the
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any class. CM can be calculated by sum of all the penalties of each record, it is
normalized by considering total number to records.
CM =
∑
allrows Penalty(rowr)
N
(2.2)
A rowr is given penalty if the row is suppressed and/or if its class label class(r) is
not the majority class label majority (G) of its group G.
Penalty can be calculated as if a record is suppressed or it is assigned to group
assume class(r) is major class but actual that class is not the major class.
2.5.3 Trade-off Metrics
Specializing from a general value to a specific value loss some level of privacy
but gain some information regarding that attribute which is specialized. Special
metric while anonymizing at final information it may gain sufficient information
but might lose so privacy that it is very difficult to do further anonymization. So
Trade-off Metrics solve this problem, both information gain and privacy loss are
calculated at every iteration of anonymization, so that optimal trade -off can be
found for both necessary requirements.
In this trade-off metric, for every specialization all records of this group are
assigned to its child level group so it gain some information(IG) and as it divides
the group size into smaller group there is privacy loss(PL). Objective of this metric
is to find a specialization whose information gain is maximum for each privacy loss
IGPL =
IG(s)
PL(s) + 1
(2.3)
Where IG(s) = Information gain can be decrement of class entropy or decrement
of distortion by specialization.
PL(s) = avgA(QIDj)− As(QIDj) (2.4)
Where Privacy loss PL(s) is the average decrement of anonymity over all QIDj
that contain the attribute of s and
A(QIDj) = the anonymity before specializing of attribute j.
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2.6 Global Recording Algorithms
2.6.1 Datafly Algorithm
The Datafly algorithm [Sweeney (1997)] goes with the assumptions that the best
solutions are the ones that are attained after generalizing the variables with the
most distinct values (unique items) [1]. The search space is the whole lattice.
However, this approach only goes through a few nodes in the lattice to find its
solution. This approach is very efficient from a time perspective. Datafly uses a
greedy algorithm to search the domain generalization hierarchy. At every step, it
chooses the locally optimal move. One drawback with Datafly approach is that it
may become trapped in a local optimum.
Here is a summary of the Datafly algorithm:
1. Consider a table MT = PT[QI] (takes into consideration only the quasi-
identifiers fields)
2. While k-anonymity is not achieved and the count of the remaining rows that
do not comply to k -anonymity is more than k :
(a) Get the number of distinct values of each attribute in MT
(b) Generalize the attribute with the most distinct values
3. Suppress the remaining rows
2.6.2 Samarati Algorithm
Samarati algorithm assumes that the best solutions in the lattice are the ones that
result in a table having minimal generalizations [10]. So, the solutions are available
in the height that is minimal in a lattice. The algorithm is based on the axiom
that if a node at level h, in domain generalization hierarchy satisfies k -anonymity,
then all the levels of height higher than h also satisfy k -anonymity. In order
to search the lattice and identify the lowest level with the generalizations that
satisfy k -anonymity with minimal suppression, Samarati used binary search. The
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algorithm goes through the lattice with a binary search, always cutting the search
space in half. It goes down the level if a solution is found at that level, otherwise
it goes up the lattice [12]. Eventually, the algorithm finds the solution with the
lowest height with the least generalizations. This level ensures less information
loss but time consumed is higher than Datafly.
Figure 2.6: Visual comparison of Datafly and Samaratis algorithms
The summary of Samarati algorithm:
1. Consider a table T = PT[QI] to be generalized (takes into consideration only
the quasi-identifiers fields).
2. Consider the middle height in the area of search (area of search is initially
the whole lattice).
3. Check if at that height there is at least one node that satisfies k -anonymity
with minimum suppression (the minimum suppression variable would be
already set) then,
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(a) If not the minimum, specify the upper half as the new area of search.
(b) If minimum, specify the lower half as the new area of search.
4. If the area of search consists of more than one level in the lattice, repeat
step 2. Otherwise, return a solution residing on this level.
2.6.3 Incognito Algorithm
Figure 2.7: Example of Incognito algorithm
Incognito implements a dynamic programming approach which satisfy subset
property which states that a relation T cannot be k-anonymous if it’s subset of
quasi-identifiers does not satisfy k -anonymity. The approach constructs gener-
alization lattice of each subset of QIs and checks by performing a breadth-first
bottom-up search [18]. The number of generalization lattice constructed in case
of Incognito for QIs of order r is 2r. Thus Incognito algorithm is of order (2r) be-
cause at least one lattice is checked for k -anonymity in every generalization lattice.
2.6.4 OLA Algorithm
El Emam et al: suggested an algorithm called Optimal Lattice Anonymization
and presented that it outperforms Incognito [20]. It use predictive-tagging to
reduce the search space of the lattice. However, if global optimal k -anonymous
lattice lie on or above the middle level of full domain generalized hierarchy, then
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the algorithm check all the middle level lattices for k -anonymity. This algorithms
checks only the middle level of full domain generalized hierarchy is exponential in
number of QIs.
Figure 2.8: Example of OLA algorithm
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Chapter 3
Proposed Work
3.1 Introduction
k - Anonymization is a primary approach for the de-identification of datasets con-
taining person specific information. In our work, we have described a approach
to implement most of the k -anonymity algorithms and also proposed a paral-
lel scheme that produces better results with real-world datasets. The maximum
count of QIs for the datasets considered by them is only nine. If the count of
QI’s is very high, then it would be difficult to put all the data items in the main
memory.
1. ILoss To calculate the data loss while anonymizing the data proposed a
data metric known as ILoss [12].
ILoss =
||vg|| − 1
||DA|| (3.1)
Where ||vg| | is total number of childrens of the node.
||vg| | is total count of leaf nodes for that attribute having Vg as a node. If
ILoss= 0, means value remains ungeneralized, same as in original table. It
calculates the fraction of leaf nodes that are generalized.
Example: Let a value is generalized from Lawyer to professional. So its
ILoss =2−1
4
= 0.25. After generalization ILoss for any record can calculated
as
ILoss(r) =
∑
(Wg ∗ ILoss(vg)) (3.2)
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Where Wg is predefined weight penalty assigned to each quasi-identifier The
total for complete generalized table is
ILoss(r) =
∑
r∈T
ILoss(r) (3.3)
2. Discernibility After anonymizing dataset, each equivalence class has its size
that is number of records in it. The class size contributes to the anonymiza-
tion based on cost, it can be calculated for complete generalized dataset by
using the formula
DM = ||Ei||2 (3.4)
Where ||Ei| | is the size of equivalence class minimize Discernibility cost leads
to less distortion with is desirable requirement for better anonymization.
3.2 Proposed Approach
Our work is based on a general framework for the efficient application of k -
anonymity based algorithms. In [21], suggested a time efficient application of
the k -anonymization algorithm. Furthermore, we evaluate the framework in cur-
rent section and outline the fundamental objective behind it. The main task is
to check the k -anonymous status of level nodes in a parallel manner by using the
threads and this task should be time efficient.
The preliminary work of this scheme is a well-planned memory layout, which
allows the optimal application of various generalization schemes to a given dataset.
Additionally, the anonymization operations are problem specific. It offers some
further optimization. The general implementation, involving optimization applied
to all global recording based anonymization schemes i.e. samarati algorithm.
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Algorithm 1 SearchLattice
Input: GeneralizedLattice, minLevel, maxLevel
Output: optimalNode
1: if minLevel > maxLevel then
2: optimalNode ← minILoss(anonymityNodes);
3: return optimalNode;
4: else
5: midLevel ← ⌊minLevel+maxLevel
2
⌋
;
6: anonymityNodes ← SearchNodesParallel(GeneralizedLattice, midLevel);
7: if |anonymityNodes| > 0 then
8: SearchLattice(GeneralizedLattice, minLevel, midLevel-1);
9: else
10: SearchLattice(GeneralizedLattice, midLevel+1, maxLevel);
11: end if
12: end if
The generalized lattice with minimum level and maximum level i.e. height
will be given to the above function which acts as a main program for finding the
optimal node, we use the binary search method. The midLevel will be calculated
by taking the half of the lattice height and then the Lattice will be passed through
the SearchNodesParallel() to perform the parallelism for the nodes in that level.
The SearchLattice( ) uses the recursive method by calling itself. Thus if there is
at least one node in anonymityNodes(midLevel) then the recursion will take place
as SearchLattice(minLevel, midLevel-1) i.e. we will consider the lower part of
the lattice with respect to midLevel. Otherwise the anonymityNodes(midLevel+1,
maxLevel) i.e. we will consider the upper part of the lattice with respect to the
midLevel. When the minLevel is greater than the maxLevel we finally calculate
the information loss for all the nodes in the minLevel that is having at least having
one node in the lattice and it will assign to the optimalNode and it will return as
output.
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Algorithm 2 SearchNodesParallel
Input: GenerlizedLattice, midLevel
Output: anonymityNodes
1: N ← no. of nodes at midlevel ;
2: Node[N] ← store nodes from midLevel ;
3: parfor i = 1 to N
4: if kAnonymous(Node[i]) == TRUE then
5: anonymityNodes[ ] ← Node[i] ;
6: end if
7: end parfor
8: return anonymityNodes ;
We use parallelism to evaluate nodes of the level through parallelism. The
SearchNodesParallel( ) will take the parameters level which will have the nodes in
it and the lattice. Create a thread for the each node in that level, each thread will
execute parallel in the run. The nodes which will satisfy k -anonymity will assign
to the anonymityNodes( ). The output will be generated the anonymityNodes( ).
3.3 Basic Implementation
Now we apply our algorithm to the three quasi-identifier of Age, Gender, Zipcode
as shown in the table 2.2. The maximum generalization gierarchied for the Age=2,
Gender=1 and Zipcode=5.
Now for k=2, the algorithm follows the below steps to find the level to apply
parallelism, so all the nodes in that level can execute parallel. The Generslized-
Lattice is given in the fig 3.1 acts as a input search space.
The solution space of lattice as shown in the figure 3.5, is having the minLevel
=4 and the optimalNode is (1,1,2)
The solution space of lattice as shown in the figure 3.9, is having the minLevel
=5 and the optimalNode having the nodes are (2,0,3) and (1,1,3). So now we need
to calculate the ILoss for the both nodes as given in the equation 3.2 and return
the optimalNode as the node which is having minimum ILoss.
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Figure 3.1: Generalized Lattice
Figure 3.2: Step-1 Lattice with k=2
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Figure 3.3: Step-2 Lattice with k=2
Figure 3.4: Step-3 Lattice with k=2
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Figure 3.5: Solution space of Lattice with k=2
Figure 3.6: Step-1 Lattice with k=5
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Figure 3.7: Step-2 Lattice with k=5
Figure 3.8: Step-3 Lattice with k=5
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Figure 3.9: Solution space of Lattice with k=5
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Chapter 4
Implementation and Results
4.1 Implementation
The data was extracted from the CENSUS data set which is available at ftp://
ftp.ics.uci.edu/pub/machine-learning-databases/adult/. The data con-
sists of 7 attributes (age, gender, education level, marital status, race, work class,
country). The number of data records are 31,062.
Implementation is done on System having configuration Intel (R) core(TM) i7-
2670QM CPU @ 2.20 GHz, 8GB RAM. Our implementation is done JAVA. Com-
plete Adult Data Set which contains 31,062 records is taken for analysis results.
The attributes for quasi identifier are Age is numeric, Work class is categorical,
Education is categorical, Marital status is categorical, Race is categorical, Gender
is categorical, and Occupation and Salary are sensitive attributes. We have taken
Discernibility Metric and Execution Time as parameters to evaluate and analyses
the result for k values taken as 2, 5, 10 over the proposed algorithm and other pre-
vious algorithms like Samarati, Incognito, OLA(Optimal lattice Anonymization).
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Table 4.1: Description of Adult Dataset
S.No. Attributes Generalizations Distict value Height
1 Work Class Taxonomy Tree 7 3
2 Education Taxonomy Tree 16 4
3 Marital Status Taxonomy Tree 7 3
4 Race Taxonomy Tree 5 2
5 Sex Suppression 2 1
6 Occupation Taxonomy Tree 14 2
7 Salary Suppression 2 1
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Discernibility Metric
We used Discernibility Metric to measure the quality of anonymized data, the
lesser is discernibility cost, better is the quality is anonymized Data. By referring
figures Figure-4.1, Figure-4.3 and Figure-4.5, we can conclude that For smaller
k value k=2, 5 and 10, for all number quasi-identifiers taken our approach give
better anonymized data than incognito, Samarati and OLA algorithm and if k is
large, k= 10 and number of quasi identifier taken not large our approach gives
lesser discernibility.
Figure 4.1: Discernibility vs Quasi-Identifier
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4.2.2 Execution Time
We considered Execution time also to evaluate and compare our approach with
Incognito and Samarati and OLA. By referring figures Figure-4.2, Figure-4.4,
Figure-4.6, we can conclude that for all k values 2, 5, 10 and our approach take
lesser execution time than Incognito, Samarati, and OLA algorithm. For all k
values taken and for all number of quasi identifier taken so we can conclude our
approach is faster compared to others.
Figure 4.2: Time(sec) vs Quasi-Identifier
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Figure 4.3: Discernibility vs Quasi-Identifier
Figure 4.4: Time(sec) vs Quasi-Identifier
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Figure 4.5: Discernibility vs Quasi-Identifier
Figure 4.6: Time(sec) vs Quasi-Identifier
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In our work, we have described a framework to implement most of the k -anonymity
algorithms and also proposed a parallelism scheme that produces better results
with real-world datasets. We explained that the frameworks applicable for the
implementation of k -anonymity algorithms like Incognito, Datafly and optimal
lattice anonymization (OLA). The proposed approach of k - anonymization, which
gives better result than Incognito, Samarati, OLA, and Datafly. As it traverse the
lattice through binary search method, and it utilizes the parallelism in best way
to reduce the time complexity extensively with the use of the proposed layout.
In future, the algorithms discussed in this thesis can be further improved by
reducing the size of the solution space and applying improved searching algorithms.
39
Bibliography
[1] P. Samarati and L. Sweeney, “Generalizing data to provide anonymity when
disclosing information,” in PODS, vol. 98, p. 188, 1998.
[2] B. Fung, K. Wang, R. Chen, and P. S. Yu, “Privacy-preserving data publish-
ing: A survey of recent developments,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR),
vol. 42, no. 4, p. 14, 2010.
[3] Y. Yuan, J. Yang, J. Zhang, S. Lan, and J. Zhang, “Evolution of privacy-
preserving data publishing,” in Anti-Counterfeiting, Security and Identifi-
cation (ASID), 2011 IEEE International Conference on, pp. 34–37, IEEE,
2011.
[4] L. Sweeney, “k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy,” International
Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 10,
no. 05, pp. 557–570, 2002.
[5] P. Shi, L. Xiong, and B. Fung, “Anonymizing data with quasi-sensitive at-
tribute values,” in Proceedings of the 19th ACM international conference on
Information and knowledge management, pp. 1389–1392, ACM, 2010.
[6] S. K. Adusumalli and V. V. Kumari, “Attribute based anonymity for preserv-
ing privacy,” in Advances in Computing and Communications, pp. 572–579,
Springer, 2011.
[7] B. Bercˇicˇ and C. George, “Identifying personal data using relational database
design principles,” International Journal of Law and Information Technology,
vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 233–251, 2009.
40
Bibliography
[8] K. El Emam, F. K. Dankar, R. Issa, E. Jonker, D. Amyot, E. Cogo, J.-
P. Corriveau, M. Walker, S. Chowdhury, R. Vaillancourt, et al., “A globally
optimal k-anonymity method for the de-identification of health data,” Journal
of the American Medical Informatics Association, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 670–682,
2009.
[9] J. Goldberger and T. Tassa, “Efficient anonymizations with enhanced utility,”
in Data Mining Workshops, 2009. ICDMW’09. IEEE International Confer-
ence on, pp. 106–113, IEEE, 2009.
[10] M. Hua and J. Pei, “A survey of utility-based privacy-preserving data
transformation methods,” in Privacy-Preserving Data Mining, pp. 207–237,
Springer, 2008.
[11] G. V. Kanth and B. S. Kumar, “A study of novel anonymization techniques
for secure data publishing,” in International Journal of Engineering Research
and Technology, vol. 2, ESRSA Publications, 2013.
[12] A. Gionis and T. Tassa, “k-anonymization with minimal loss of informa-
tion,” Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 21, no. 2,
pp. 206–219, 2009.
[13] L. Sweeney, “Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using generaliza-
tion and suppression,” International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and
Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 10, no. 05, pp. 571–588, 2002.
[14] P. Samarati and L. Sweeney, “Protecting privacy when disclosing information:
k-anonymity and its enforcement through generalization and suppression,”
tech. rep., Technical report, SRI International, 1998.
[15] B. C. Fung, K. Wang, A. W.-C. Fu, and S. Y. Philip, Introduction to privacy-
preserving data publishing: concepts and techniques. CRC Press, 2010.
[16] V. S. Iyengar, “Transforming data to satisfy privacy constraints,” in Pro-
ceedings of the eighth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge
discovery and data mining, pp. 279–288, ACM, 2002.
41
Bibliography
[17] K. LeFevre, D. J. DeWitt, and R. Ramakrishnan, “Incognito: Efficient full-
domain k-anonymity,” in Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGMOD interna-
tional conference on Management of data, pp. 49–60, ACM, 2005.
[18] A. Meyerson and R. Williams, “On the complexity of optimal k-anonymity,”
in Proceedings of the twenty-third ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART sympo-
sium on Principles of database systems, pp. 223–228, ACM, 2004.
[19] J. Gehrke, “Models and methods for privacy-preserving data analysis and
publishing,” in Data Engineering, 2006. ICDE’06. Proceedings of the 22nd
International Conference on, pp. 105–105, IEEE, 2006.
[20] R. C.-W. Wong, A. W.-C. Fu, K. Wang, and J. Pei, “Anonymization-based at-
tacks in privacy-preserving data publishing,” ACM Transactions on Database
Systems (TODS), vol. 34, no. 2, p. 8, 2009.
[21] Z. FeiFei, D. LiFeng, W. Kun, and L. Yang, “Study on privacy protection
algorithm based on k-anonymity,” Physics Procedia, vol. 33, pp. 483–490,
2012.
42
